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July 28, 2010 1 Introduction
Although death is one of the true certainties in life, the date at which it occurs is unknown to
all but the most desperate individuals. Faced with life-time uncertainty, rational non-altruistic
agents must balance the risk of leaving unconsumed wealth in the form of unintended (acci-
dental) bequests against the risk of running out of resources in old age. As was shown in the
classic analysis of Yaari (1965) and more recently by Davidoﬀ et al. (2005), life annuities are
very attractive insurance instruments in the presence of longevity risk. Intuitively, annuities
allow for risk sharing between lucky (long-lived) and unlucky (short-lived) individuals (Kot-
likoﬀ et al., 1986). These increased risk-sharing opportunities ensure that life annuities are
welfare maximizing from a microeconomic perspective, i.e. in a partial equilibrium setting.
From a macroeconomic perspective, however, it is not immediately clear whether or not
annuities are welfare improving. There are two key mechanisms that are ignored in a partial
equilibrium analysis. First, in the absence of private annuities there will be accidental bequests
which, provided they are redistributed in one way or another to surviving agents, boost the
consumption opportunities of such agents. See, among others, Sheshinski and Weiss (1981),
Abel (1985), Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), and Fehr and Habermann (2008) on this point.
Second, the availability of annuities aﬀects the rate of return on an individual’s savings. As
a result, aggregate capital accumulation will generally depend on whether or not annuity
opportunities are available. Capital accumulation in turn determines wages and the interest
rate if factor prices are endogenous.
The objective of this paper is to study the general equilibrium eﬀects of life annuities.
Our model has the following features. First, we postulate a simple general equilibrium model
of a closed economy. On the production side we allow for a capital accumulation externality
of the form proposed by Romer (1989). The production model is quite ﬂexible in that it can
accommodate both the exogenous and the endogenous growth models as special cases.
Second, we assume that the economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-
period-lived agents facing longevity risk. Just as in the Diamond (1965) model life consists of
two phases, namely youth and old age, but unlike that model there is a positive probability
of death at the end of youth. At birth, agents are identical in the sense that they feature the
same preferences, have the same labour productivity, and face the same death probability.
Third, in the absence of annuities we assume that the resulting accidental bequests ﬂow to
2the government. We investigate the general equilibrium eﬀects of three prototypical revenue
recycling schemes. In particular, the policy maker can (a) engage in wasteful expenditure
(the WE scenario), (b) give lump-sum transfers to the old (the TO scenario), or (c) provide
lump-sum transfers to the young (the TY scenario).
Fourth, we compare the diﬀerent revenue recycling schemes with the case in which an-
nuities are available. In particular, we assume that private annuity markets are perfectly
competitive. With perfect annuities (the PA scenario) the probability of death determines
the wedge between the rate of return on physical capital and the annuity rate of return. Since
the latter exceeds the former, rational non-altruistic individuals fully annuitize their savings.
The main ﬁnding of the paper concerns the phenomenon which we call the tragedy of
annuitization: although full annuitization of assets is privately optimal it may not be socially
beneﬁcial due to adverse general equilibrium repercussions. If all agents invest their ﬁnancial
wealth in the annuity market then the resulting long-run equilibrium leaves everyone worse
oﬀ compared to the case where annuities are absent and accidental bequests are redistributed
to the young (or even wasted by the government). In the exogenous growth model we demon-
strate the existence of two versions of the tragedy. In the strong version, opening up perfect
annuity markets in an economy in which accidental bequests initially go to waste (switch
from WE to PA) results in a decrease in steady-state welfare of newborns. Interestingly, this
rather surprising result holds for a reasonable (i.e., low) value of the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity. In such a case the beneﬁcial eﬀects of annuitization are more than oﬀset by a
substantial drop in the long-run capital intensity and in wages. Future newborns would have
been better oﬀ if no annuity markets had been opened.
There is also a weak version of the tragedy in the exogenous growth model. If the economy
is initially in the equilibrium with accidental bequests ﬂowing to the young, then opening up
annuity markets will reduce steady-state welfare regardless of the magnitude of the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity. Intuitively, private annuities redistribute assets from deceased
to surviving elderly in an actuarially fair way whereas transferring unintended bequests to
the young constitutes an intergenerational transfer. This intergenerational transfer induces
beneﬁcial savings eﬀects, which, in the end, lead to higher welfare.
In the endogenous growth model and restricting attention to realistic values for the in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity, both versions of the tragedy show up in terms of the
3macroeconomic growth rate. Growth is highest in the TY case, and the rate under the WE
case exceeds the one for the PA scenario.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model in its most general
form. Section 3 studies the analytical properties of the exogenous growth version of the model.
It also computes, both analytically and quantitatively, the allocation and welfare eﬀects of
scenario switches. Section 4 is the core of the paper. It shows what happens to allocation and
welfare if a perfectly competitive annuity market is opened up at some point in time. It also
highlights the importance of initial conditions, i.e. it demonstrates that the results depend
not only on the availability of annuities but also on the scenario that is replaced by these
insurance markets. Section 5 brieﬂy discusses the eﬀects of annuitization in the endogenous
growth version of the model. Section 6 restates the main results and presents some possible
extensions. All mathematical details can be found in Heijdra, Mierau, and Reijnders (2010).
2 The model
2.1 Consumers
Each agent lives for a maximum of two periods and faces a positive probability of death
between the ﬁrst and the second period. Agents work full-time during the ﬁrst period of their
lives (termed “youth”) and – if they survive – retire in the second period (“old age”). The













t+1 are consumption during youth and old age, respectively, ρ > 0 is the pure
rate of time preference, and π > 0 is the probability of death. Individuals have no bequest
motive and, therefore, attach no utility to savings that remain after they die. We assume







if σ > 0, σ  = 1,
lnC if σ = 1,
(2)
4where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The agent’s budget identities for youth
and old age are given by:
C
y





t+1 + (1 + rt+1)St, (3b)




t+1 are transfers received from the government during either youth or old age (see below).














If an agent dies before reaching old age his savings ﬂow to the government in the form of an
accidental bequest. Due to mortality risk agents are not allowed to hold negative savings (i.e.
loans). In case of premature death their loans would be unaccounted for.
The agent chooses C
y
t , Co
t+1 and St in order to maximize expected lifetime utility (1)
subject to the budget constraint (4) and a non-negativity constraint on savings. Assuming


























St = [1 − Φ(rt+1)][wt + Z
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where Φ(rt+1) is the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth (wage income and











, 0 < Φ( ) < 1. (8)
Note that the impact of a change in the future interest rate on current savings is fully de-
termined by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ. For the special case with σ = 1
(logarithmic utility) savings are completely independent of the interest rate.1 The income
1If the government provides transfers to the old (Z
o
t+1 > 0) there is also a positive human wealth eﬀect on
saving. In this paper, however, such transfers are proportional to the interest factor, 1 + rt+1, so that this
human wealth eﬀect is not operative. If the agent would also work in old age then the human wealth eﬀects
would result in an increase in the savings elasticity.
5eﬀect of a higher interest rate is exactly oﬀset by the substitution eﬀect induced by a lower
price of second period consumption. In the more general case with σ > 1 savings increase
as the interest increases because the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect. If, on
the other hand, σ < 1 the income eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect and savings
decline as the interest rate rises.2
2.2 Demography
The population grows at an exogenous rate n > 0 so that every period a cohort of Lt =
(1 + n)Lt−1 young agents is born. In principle each generation lives for two periods, but not
all of its members survive the transition from youth to old age. The total population at time
t is equal to Pt ≡ (1 − π)Lt−1 + Lt.
2.3 Production
There is a constant and large number of identical and perfectly competitive ﬁrms. The
technology available to each individual ﬁrm i is given by:
Yit = ΩtKα
itN1−α
it , 0 < α < 1, (9)
where Yit is output, Kit is the employed capital stock, Nit is the amount of labour used
in the production process, α is the capital share of output and Ωt is the aggregate level of
technology in the economy which is considered as given by individual ﬁrms. Factor demands
of the individual ﬁrm are given by the following marginal productivity conditions:
wt = (1 − α)Ωtkα
it, (10a)
rt + δ = αΩtkα−1
it , (10b)
where kit ≡ Kit/Nit is the capital intensity of ﬁrm i and δ > 0 is the depreciation rate. Under
the assumption of perfect competition in both factor markets all ﬁrms face the same factor
prices and, therefore, they all choose the same level of capital intensity kit = kt.
2From the empirical perspective the most relevant case appears to be the one with 0 < σ < 1. See, for
example, Skinner (1985) and Attanasio and Weber (1995) who report estimates ranging between, respectively,
0.3 to 0.5, and 0.6 to 0.7.
6Generalizing the insights of Pecchenino and Pollard (1997, p. 28) to a growing population
we postulate that the inter-ﬁrm investment externality takes the following form:
Ωt = Ω0k
η
t , 0 < η ≤ 1 − α, (11)
where Ω0 is a constant, kt ≡ Kt/Nt is the economy-wide capital intensity, Kt ≡
 
i Kit is the
total stock of capital and Nt ≡
 
i Nit is the total labour force.
According to (11) total factor productivity increases in line with the aggregate capital
intensity in the economy. That is, if an individual ﬁrm increases its capital stock all ﬁrms
beneﬁt through a boost in the general productivity level Ωt. The strength of this inter-ﬁrm
investment externality is governed by the parameter η. If 0 ≤ η < 1 − α then the long-run
growth rate in per capita variables is exogenously determined and equal to zero. In the knife-
edge case with η = 1 − α the investment externality exactly oﬀsets the decrease in marginal
productivity following an addition to the capital stock. The aggregate production sector then
exhibits single-sector endogenous growth of the type described in Romer (1989).










t − δ, (14)
where yt ≡ Yt/Nt is the level of output per worker and Yt ≡
 
i Yit is aggregate output. We
assume that the economy is suﬃciently productive to assure a positive interest rate even when
the investment externality attains its knife-edge value, i.e. αΩ0 > δ.
2.4 Government
The government administers the allocation of the accidental bequests, maintains a period-by-
period balanced budget, and does not issue debt or retain funds. The government’s budget
constraint is therefore given by:
π (1 + rt)Lt−1St−1 = (1 − π)Lt−1Zo
t + LtZ
y
t + Gt. (15)
That is, the total assets left behind by the agents who perish before reaching old age (left-hand
side) are used to ﬁnance total transfers to the survivors Zo
t , transfers to the newly arrived
7young Z
y
t , and unproductive government expenditure Gt.
We assume that the government can choose between two ﬁnancing scenarios. Either it
redistributes all its proceeds among the surviving agents in the form of lump-sum transfers
or it uses the funds solely for unproductive government spending.
Transfer scenario. The government can either give the revenues exclusively to the young or
exclusively to the old.3
(TY) If all the proceeds go to the young then Zo





π (1 + rt)Lt−1St−1
Lt
. (16a)
(TO) If all the transfers accrue to the elderly, both Z
y
t = Gt = 0 in (15) and transfers to the
old are given by:
Zo
t =








t = 0 in (15) and wasteful government expenditures are:
Gt = π (1 + rt)Lt−1St−1. (16c)
2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium both factor markets must clear. As all young agents work full-time and all old
agents are retired, the labour market equilibrium condition simply states that the total labour
force must equal the total number of young agents, i.e. Nt = Lt. The capital market clearing
condition implies that aggregate savings of the generation born at time t−1 must be equal to
the total stock of productive capital in period t, i.e. Kt = Lt−1St−1. It immediately follows
3Any convex combination of these two options is also feasible. We focus on the two extreme cases for ease
of illustration.









π (1 + rt)kt, (17b)
gt = π (1 + rt)kt, (17c)
where gt ≡ Gt/Lt are per worker government expenditures.
Substituting per capita savings (7) into the capital market clearing condition and using
the aggregate factor prices (13) and (14) provides the fundamental diﬀerence equation of the
model:
(1 + n)kt+1 = [1 − Φ(rt+1)][wt + Z
y





For future reference we summarize the system of equations that characterizes the macro-
economic equilibrium in Table 1. Equations (T1.1)–(T1.3) are the consumption and saving
demand functions, (T1.4) states the deﬁnition for the marginal propensity to consume, equa-
tions (T1.5) and (T1.6) are the factor prices, (T1.7) is the government budget constraint with
capital market equilibrium imposed, and (T1.8) is the fundamental diﬀerence equation.
3 The exogenous growth model
In this section and the next we study the exogenous growth version of our model, i.e. we
assume that the capital accumulation externality parameter satisﬁes 0 ≤ η < 1 − α so that
there are diminishing returns to the macroeconomic capital stock. (The knife-edge model
with η = 1 − α is brieﬂy discussed in Section 5 below.) Throughout the paper we assume
that the steady-state interest rate exceeds the rate of population growth. Empirical support
for this assumption is provided by Abel et al. (1987).
Assumption 1 [Dynamic eﬃciency] For each scenario the corresponding steady-state inter-
est rate ˆ r satisﬁes ˆ r > n.
3.1 Stability and transition
We ﬁrst study the dynamic properties of the model under the assumption that the government
wastes the revenues from accidental bequests (the WE scenario). One of the crucial structural



























St = [1 − Φ(rt+1)][wt + Z
y
















(b) Factor prices and redistribution scheme:
rt = αΩ0k
α+η−1
t − δ (T1.5)
wt = (1 − α)Ω0k
α+η
t (T1.6)






t + gt (T1.7)
(c) Fundamental diﬀerence equation:
(1 + n)kt+1 = [1 − Φ(rt+1)][wt + Z
y





Deﬁnitions: Endogenous are C
y
t , Co
t+1, St, rt+1, wt, kt, and – depending on the redistribution
scheme – one of Z
y
t or Zo
t or gt. Parameters: mortality rate π, population growth rate n, rate of time
preference ρ, capital coeﬃcient in the technology α, investment externality coeﬃcient η, scale factor
in the technology Ω0, and depreciation rate of capital δ.
10parameters is the intertemporal substitution elasticity, σ. Whilst the model can accommodate
a wide range of values for σ, we nevertheless make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 [Admissible values for σ] The intertemporal substitution elasticity satisﬁes:
0 < σ ≤ ¯ σ ≡
2 − α − η
1 − α − η
.
We defend this assumption on two grounds. First, the restriction is very mild. Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that σ falls well short of unity whereas – even in the absence of
external eﬀects (η = 0) – ¯ σ is much larger than unity. For example, for a capital share of
α = 0.3 we ﬁnd that ¯ σ = 2.43. In the presence of external eﬀects (η > 0) ¯ σ is even larger.
Second, by restricting the range of admissible values for σ the existence and stability proofs
are simpliﬁed substantially.









t [≡ Γ(kt)], (19)







 σ  
1 − δ + αΩ0kα+η−1 σ−1
 −1
. (20)
It is easy to show that Ψ′ > 0 and Γ′ > 0. We can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 [Existence and stability of the WE model] Consider the WE model as given
in (19)–(20) and adopt Assumption 2. The following properties can be established:
(i) The model has two steady-state solutions; the trivial one features kt+1 = kt = 0, and
the economically relevant satisﬁes kt+1 = kt = ˆ kWE, where ˆ kWE is the solution to:
ˆ kWE









< 1, for kt+1 = kt = ˆ kWE.
For any positive initial value the capital intensity converges monotonically to ˆ kWE.
4Equation (20) is obtained by substituting (T1.5) into (8).
11Proof: See Heijdra et al. (2010, Appendix A). ￿
We visualize the corresponding phase diagram in Figure 1(a) for diﬀerent values of the
intertemporal substitution elasticity. This ﬁgure is based on the following plausible parameter
values that are used throughout much of the paper. In the benchmark case we assume that
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is σ = 1 (i.e. log-utility), and that the investment
externality is absent (η = 0). Each phase of life covers 40 years, the population grows by
one percent per annum (so that n = (1 + 0.01)
40 − 1 = 0.49), individuals face a probability
of death between youth and old age of thirty percent (π = 0.3), the capital share of output
is thirty percent (α = 0.3), and the depreciation rate of capital is six percent per annum
(δ = 0.92). We set the production function constant and time preference rate such that
output per worker is equal to unity and the interest rate is four percent per annum (ˆ r = 3.80)
in the WE scenario. We obtain Ω0 = 2.29 and ρ = 3.47 or 3.82% annually. The resulting
steady-state values of the key variables of the model are given in Table 2(a).5 Note that
Assumptions 1 and 2 are both satisﬁed for this calibration.
In Figure 1(a) the solid line represents the fundamental diﬀerence equation (19) (for
σ = 1) and the dotted line is the steady-state condition kt+1 = kt.6 The economically relevant
steady-state equilibrium is at point E where the slope of (19) is strictly less than unity. Figure
1(b) plots Ψ(k) (for diﬀerent values of σ) and Γ(k) separately. It conveniently illustrates the
existence and stability properties of the two steady-state equilibria. In particular, it visualizes
Proposition 1(ii) which proves that Γ(k) is steeper (ﬂatter) than Ψ(k) around k = 0 (k = ˆ k)
for all feasible values of σ.
Suppose that at some time t the economy has converged to the steady-state implied by
the WE scenario, i.e. kt = ˆ kWE. What would happen at impact, during transition, and in the
long run if the government were to switch to a transfer scenario? We study two such policy
switches in turn, namely from WE to TO and from WE to TY.
5For diﬀerent values of σ we re-calibrate the model (by choice of ρ and Ω0) such that output and the interest
rate remain the same in the WE scenario.
6The dash-dotted and dashed lines in Figure 1(a) represent the fundamental diﬀerence equation for diﬀerent
values of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, σ. Mathematically, these lines are described by kt+1 =
Ψ
−1 (Γ(kt)).
12Figure 1: Phase diagram and steady-state equilibria
(a) Phase diagram






































































13Table 2: Steady-state values with exogenous growth⋆
Panel A: η = 0, σ = 1 Panel B: η = 0, σ = 1
2 Panel C: η = 0, σ = 3
2
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
WE TO TY PA WE TO TY PA WE TO TY PA
ˆ Cy 0.6053 0.5512 0.7218 0.6053 0.6053 0.5057 0.7393 0.5577 0.6053 0.5681 0.7145 0.6226
ˆ Co 0.4546 0.5647 0.4804 0.6495 0.4546 0.5040 0.5002 0.5741 0.4546 0.5893 0.4725 0.6815
ˆ S 0.0947 0.0604 0.1129 0.0947 0.0947 0.0417 0.1284 0.0746 0.0947 0.0693 0.1071 0.1104
ˆ Zo 0.1694 0.1512 0.1768
ˆ Zy 0.0968 0.1008 0.0952
ˆ y 1.0000 0.8736 1.0542 1.0000 1.0000 0.7821 1.0957 0.8877 1.0000 0.9105 1.0377 1.0472
ˆ k 0.0636 0.0405 0.0758 0.0636 0.0636 0.0280 0.0862 0.0428 0.0636 0.0465 0.0720 0.0742
ˆ w 0.7000 0.6115 0.7380 0.7000 0.7000 0.5474 0.7670 0.6214 0.7000 0.6374 0.7264 0.7330
ˆ r 3.8010 5.5491 3.2541 3.8010 3.8010 7.4546 2.8954 5.3121 3.8010 4.9544 3.4106 3.3198
ˆ ra 4.00 4.81 3.69 4.00 4.00 5.48 3.46 4.71 4.00 4.56 3.78 3.73
ˆ rA
a 4.93 5.65 4.65
  EΛ
y
−0.6253 −0.6851 −0.4406 −0.5695 −0.7930 −1.0930 −0.4699 −0.8801 −0.5816 −0.5988 −0.4322 −0.5003
⋆Hats denote steady-state values. To facilitate interpretation, ˆ ra and ˆ rA
a are reported as annual percentage rates of return.
1
43.1.1 Transfers to the old
The eﬀects of a policy switch from the WE scenario to the TO scenario can be studied with






kt+1 = Γ(kt), (21)
where Γ(kt) is deﬁned in (19) above, z1 is a perturbation parameter (0 ≤ z1 ≤ 1) and
Ψ(kt+1,z1) features positive partial derivatives Ψk > 0 and Ψz1 > 0. The case with z1 = 0 is
the WE scenario whilst for z1 = 1 the TO case is obtained. The policy switch thus consists of
a unit increase in z1 occurring at time t in combination with the initial condition kt = ˆ kWE.
We provide the following proposition.
Proposition 2 [Existence and stability of the TO model] Consider the TO model as given
in (21) and adopt Assumption 2. The following properties can be established:
(i) The model has two steady-state solutions; the trivial one features kt+1 = kt = 0, and
the economically relevant one satisﬁes kt+1 = kt = ˆ kTO, where ˆ kTO is the solution to:
1 + π
1−πΦ(ˆ kTO)









< 1, for kt+1 = kt = ˆ kTO.
For any positive initial value the capital intensity converges monotonically to ˆ kTO.
(iii) The steady-state capital intensity satisﬁes the following inequality:
0 < ˆ kTO < ˆ kWE.
Proof: See Heijdra et al. (2010, Appendix B). ￿
For σ = 1 we visualize the transitional dynamics of the capital intensity in Figure 2(a)
whilst the quantitative long-run results are reported in Table 2(b). In Figure 2(a) the hor-
izontal axis records post-shock time τ and the vertical axis gives the values of kt+τ. By
giving transfers to old agents, the old at the time of the policy switch (τ = 0) are able to
15Figure 2: Transitional dynamics in the exogenous growth model
Panel A: Benchmark: σ = 1
(a) capital intensity (kt+τ) (b) expected lifetime utility (EΛ
y
t+τ)
































(c) youth consumption (C
y
t+τ) (d) old-age consumption (Co
t+τ)
































Panel B: Weak intertemporal substitution eﬀect: σ = 1
2
(e) capital intensity (kt+τ) (f) expected lifetime utility (EΛ
y
t+τ)
































(g) youth consumption (C
y
t+τ) (h) old-age consumption (Co
t+τ)




























Panel C: Strong intertemporal substitution eﬀect: σ = 3
2
(i) capital intensity (kt+τ) (j) expected lifetime utility (EΛ
y
t+τ)

































(k) youth consumption (C
y
t+τ) (l) old-age consumption (Co
t+τ)































18increase their consumption as they had not anticipated this windfall gain (see Figure 2(d)).
The young at the time of the shock, however, react to the transfers they will receive in old
age by reducing their saving below what it would have been under the WE scenario. This
explains why the capital intensity drops substantially for τ = 1 and beyond. Indeed, by using

















Ψk − Γ′ < 0, (22)
where limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kTO. As the information in Table 2(a)–(b) reveals, compared to the
WE scenario, long-run output per worker falls by almost thirteen percent under the TO case.
Whereas the steady-state consumption proﬁle is downward sloping under the WE scenario
(Co < Cy), it is upward sloping for the TO case (Co > Cy). This result follows from the
sharp increase in the interest rate that occurs in the TO scenario.7
Panels B and C in Table 2 and Figure 2 quantify and visualize the cases with, respectively,
a weak intertemporal substitution eﬀect (Panel B featuring σ = 1
2) and a strong intertemporal
substitution eﬀect (Panel C featuring σ = 3
2). The results are qualitatively the same as for
the case with σ = 1. Quantitatively a relatively low (high) intertemporal substitution eﬀect
exacerbates (mitigates) the crowding-out eﬀect on the capital intensity.
3.1.2 Transfers to the young
A policy switch from the WE case to the TY scenario can be studied with the following
fundamental diﬀerence equation for the capital intensity:
Ψ(kt+1) =
[1 − α(1 − z2π)]Ω0k
α+η
t + z2π (1 − δ)kt
1 + n
[≡ Γ(kt,z2)], (23)
where Ψ(kt+1) is deﬁned on the left-hand side of (19), z2 is a perturbation parameter (0 ≤
z2 ≤ 1) and Γ(kt,z2) features positive partial derivatives Γk > 0 and Γz2 > 0. At time t
there is a unit increase in z2 and kt = ˆ kWE is the initial condition. We provide the following
proposition.













19Proposition 3 [Existence and stability of the TY model] Consider the TY model as given in
(23) and adopt Assumption 2. The following properties can be established:
(i) The model has two steady-state solutions; the trivial one features kt+1 = kt = 0, and
the economically relevant satisﬁes kt+1 = kt = ˆ kTY, where ˆ kTY is the solution to:
ˆ kTY
1 − Φ(ˆ kTY)
=
[1 − α(1 − π)]Ω0(ˆ kTY)α+η + π (1 − δ)ˆ kTY
1 + n
.




< 1, for kt+1 = kt = ˆ kTY.
For any positive initial value the capital intensity converges monotonically to ˆ kTY.
(iii) The steady-state capital intensity satisﬁes the following inequality:
0 < ˆ kWE < ˆ kTY.
Proof: See Heijdra et al. (2010, Appendix C). ￿
For σ = 1 we visualize the transitional dynamics of the capital intensity in Figure 2(a)
whilst the quantitative long-run results are reported in Table 2(c). As Figure 2(a) shows, the
capital intensity increases over time. By giving transfers to young agents only, the old at the
time of the policy switch (τ = 0) experience no eﬀect at all. They just execute the plans
conceived during their youth. In contrast, the shock-time young react to these transfers by
increasing their saving above what it would have been under the WE scenario. This explains
why the capital intensity increases dramatically for τ = 1 and beyond – see the solid line in



















where limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kTY. As the information in Table 2(a) and (c) reveals, compared to the
WE scenario, long-run output per worker increases by more than ﬁve percent under the TY
case. Because the steady-state interest rate falls, the long-run consumption proﬁle becomes
more downward sloping than it was in the WE scenario.8
8Panels B and C in Table 2 and Figure 2 conﬁrm that the magnitude of σ aﬀects the quantitative but not
the qualitative conclusions.
203.2 Welfare analysis
In this section we study the welfare implications of the diﬀerent scenarios. With bounded
externalities (0 ≤ η < 1 − α) consumption by young and old agents ultimately converges
to time-invariant steady-state values. As a result we can compare the welfare eﬀects of the
separate regimes by focusing on the life-time utility of newborns, both along the transition
path and in the steady state. The welfare eﬀect for the old at the time of the shock follows
trivially from their budget identity (3b) which can be rewritten as:
Co
t = Zo
t + (1 + rt)(1 + n)kt, (25)
where we have used the fact that St−1 = (1 + n)kt. For the shock-time old agents all terms
featuring in (25) are predetermined except the transfers to the old, Zo
t , occurring exclusively
in the TO scenario. Hence, Co
t will not change following a policy change except if the switch
is to the TO case.
The (indirect) lifetime utility function of current and future newborns can be written as
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1 − 1/σ
for σ > 0, σ  = 1
Ξ0 +







ln(1 + rt+τ+1) for σ = 1
(26)
where Ξ0 is a constant9 and human wealth at birth of agents born τ periods after the policy
change is given by:
H
y







The expressions in (25)–(27) are used to compute the transitions paths in Figures 2(b), (f),
and (j) and the entries for   EΛ
y
in the ﬁnal row of Table 2. For the analytical welfare eﬀects
at impact and in the long run, however, we employ the envelope theorem (see Heijdra et al.,
2010). We consider each scenario change in turn.
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213.2.1 Transfers to the old
First we consider the welfare eﬀects of a switch from the steady state of the WE case to the
TO scenario. In what follows, ˆ Co, ˆ Cy, ˆ r, ˆ w, and ˆ k denote steady-state values associated with








U′( ˆ Co)π (1 + ˆ r)ˆ k > 0. (28)
The shock-time old are unambiguously better oﬀ because they receive a windfall transfer
from the government. The welfare eﬀect on the young at time t is more complicated because
they can still alter their consumption and savings decisions in the light of the policy change.
Although the wage rate faced by these agents is predetermined, their revised saving plans will
















The ﬁrst term in square brackets represents the direct eﬀect of the lump-sum transfer received
in old age. Taken in isolation, this transfer expands the choice set and thus increases expected
lifetime utility of shock-time newborns. The direct eﬀect can be explained with the aid of
Figure 3(a). The original budget line passes through E0, which is the initial equilibrium. The
shock-time young anticipate transfers in old age equal to Z0
t+1. This shifts up the budget
line in a parallel fashion.10 Holding constant the initially expected future interest rate, the
optimal point shifts from E0 to E′. But this is not the end of the story because it is only the
partial equilibrium eﬀect.
The second term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (29) represents the general
equilibrium eﬀect of the policy switch. It follows from (22) that the future capital stock is
lower and the interest rate is higher as a result of the switch. In terms of Figure 3(a) the
budget line pivots in a clockwise fashion around point A0 and optimal consumption moves
from E′ to E1. At impact the general equilibrium eﬀect thus brings about a further expansion
of the choice set faced by the shock-time young. Not surprisingly, therefore, the change in
welfare at impact is unambiguously positive for such agents. In terms of Figure 2(b) the
dash-dotted line lies above the dashed line at post-shock time τ = 0.




22Figure 3: Eﬀect of government transfers in the exogenous growth model














































23Before turning to the long-run welfare eﬀects we ﬁrst introduce the following lemma
exploiting an important property of the factor-price frontier.
Lemma 1 [Implications of the factor price frontier] Assume that 0 ≤ η < 1 − α (exogenous
growth model), the economy is initially in the steady state associated with the WE or TY
scenario, and adopt Assumption 1 (ˆ r > n, dynamic eﬃciency). Let dkt+∞/dzi denote the
long-run eﬀect on the capital intensity of a unit perturbation in zi occurring at shock-time
τ = 0 and evaluated at zi = 0. It follows that the long-run eﬀect on weighted factor prices
can be written as:
ˆ Co










where ∆ is a positive constant:
∆ ≡
 
η + α(1 − α − η)
ˆ r − n
1 + ˆ r
 
ˆ r + δ
α
> 0. (L1.2)
Proof: See Heijdra et al. (2010, Appendix E). ￿
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where we have used Lemma 1 and note that limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kTO. The ﬁrst term in brackets
represents the steady-state direct eﬀect, which is positive. The second term comprises the
general equilibrium eﬀect, which is negative because capital is crowded out in the long run
(see (22) above). On the one hand the reduction in the long-run capital intensity increases the
interest rate which positively aﬀects welfare. But on the other hand it also reduces the wage
rate, which lowers welfare. In terms of Figure 3(a), the budget line shifts to the left because
of the fall in the long-run wage ( ˆ wTO < ˆ wWE). In addition, long-run transfers are lower than
anticipated transfers at impact ( ˆ Zo < Zo
t+1) so that point A∞ lies south-west from A0. The
steady-state interest rate exceeds the future rate faced by shock-time newborns (ˆ rTO > rt+1),
i.e. the budget line is steeper than at impact. The steady-state equilibrium is at point E∞.
Comparing columns (a) and (b) of Table 2 reveals that the long-run welfare eﬀect of the
policy switch is negative, i.e. the crowding out of capital induces a very strong reduction in
wages which dominates the joint eﬀect of the transfers and the interest rate. Ignoring agents
24who are alive at the time of the shock, it is thus better to let the accidental bequests go
to waste than to give them to the elderly. To better understand the intuition behind this
remarkable result, we ﬁrst state the following lemma on the key features of the steady-state
ﬁrst-best social optimum (FBSO).
Lemma 2 [Golden rules] Assume that 0 ≤ η < 1 − α (exogenous growth model), and deﬁne
steady-state welfare of a young agent (L2.1), the economy-wide resource constraint (L2.2),
and the macroeconomic production function (L2.3) as follows:




f (k) − (δ + n)k = Cy +
1 − π
1 + n
Co + g, (L2.2)
f (k) = Ω0kα+η. (L2.3)
The social planner chooses non-negative values for Cy, Co, k, and g in order to maximize
EΛy subject to the constraints (L2.2)–(L2.3). In addition to satisfying the constraints the







f′(˜ k) = n + δ, (S2)
˜ g = 0. (S3)
Proof: See Heijdra et al. (2010, Appendix F). ￿
Using the terminology of Samuelson (1968), we refer to requirement (S1) of the FBSO as
the Biological-Interest-Rate Golden Rule (BGR), and to requirement (S2) as the Production
Golden Rule (PGR). Of course, requirement (S3) just states that the social planner does not
waste valuable resources.
Armed with Lemma 2 we can investigate the eﬃciency properties of the market economy.
In the decentralized equilibrium for the WE scenario the steady-state equilibrium satisﬁes the









f′(ˆ k) = ˆ r + δ, (W2)
ˆ g = π (1 + ˆ r)ˆ k. (W3)
25Comparing (W1)–(W3) to (S1)–(S3) we ﬁnd that the WE equilibrium features three distor-
tions. First, the government engages in wasteful expenditure (ˆ g > ˜ g = 0). Second, the death
probability aﬀects the consumption Euler equation in the decentralized equilibrium i.e. π
features in (W1) but not in (S1). There is a missing market in that agents cannot insure
against longevity risk. Third, if η is strictly positive the decentralized economy underinvests
in physical capital because the capital externality is not internalized by individual agents.
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π (1 + n)ˆ k
1 − π
[1 − Θ], (31)




α(1 − α − η)
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ˆ r − n
1 + ˆ r
 




1 − (1 − σ) ˆ r+δ
1+ˆ rΦ(ˆ k)
≥ 0. (32)
In combination with Lemma 2, the expressions in (31)–(32) can be used to build intuition on
the long-run welfare eﬀect of the policy switch from WE to TO. In adopting the TO scenario
wasteful government expenditure is eliminated which implies that one distortion is removed,
i.e. (S3) holds for the TO case and ˆ gTO = ˜ g = 0. If there were no capital externality (η = 0)
and the steady-state interest rate would equal the rate of population growth (ˆ rTO = n) then
(S2) would also hold under the TO case, i.e. ˆ kTO = ˜ k. The only distortion that would remain
is the one resulting from the missing insurance market, i.e. (1 − π)
 
1 + ˆ rTO 
< 1 + n. For
ˆ r = n and η = 0 we ﬁnd from (32) that Θ = 0 and from (31) that the long-run welfare eﬀect is
strictly positive. The switch from WE to TO beneﬁts all generations to the same extent in this
hypothetical case because waste is eliminated, there is no transitional dynamics in the capital
stock (and thus in factor prices), and the additional resources lead to an equiproportionate
increase in youth and old-age consumption.
Matters are much more complicated if we adopt Assumption 1. For ˆ r > n it follows from
(32) that Θ is strictly positive and, ceteris paribus ˆ r and ˆ k, increasing in the externality
parameter η. If η = 0 then WE and TO share two distortions, namely the missing insurance
market and the violation of the BGR. It is a straightforward application of the theory of
the second best that the welfare ranking between WE and TO is ambiguous in that case.
In Table 3(a) we compute Θ for several values of the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
Interestingly, Θ is strictly larger than unity for all but the most extreme values of σ. And for
26a relatively small capital externality (Table 3(b) with η = 1
10) the same conclusion holds for
all admissible values of σ!
In a plausibly parameterized dynamically eﬃcient economy (ˆ r > n) the switch from WE
to TO is welfare decreasing because it induces a decrease in the capital intensity and an
increase in the interest rate in the long run. Hence, the policy switch moves the economy
further away from the FBSO.
3.2.2 Transfers to the young
We consider the welfare eﬀects of a switch from the steady state of the WE case to the TY
scenario and let ˆ Co, ˆ Cy, ˆ r, ˆ w, and ˆ k denote the steady-state values associated with WE. In
the TY scenario the shock-time old do not receive any additional resources, i.e. dEΛ
y
t−1 (z2)/
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where the ﬁrst term in square brackets is the direct eﬀect and the second term is the general
equilibrium eﬀect. The direct eﬀect is positive but the general equilibrium eﬀect is negative
because the policy switch boosts capital accumulation which leads to a reduction in the future
interest rate. It is not diﬃcult to show, however, that the direct eﬀect is dominant so that
welfare rises at impact. In terms of Figure 3(b) the initial budget line passes through point
E0, the lump-sum transfer shifts the line in a parallel fashion to the right, and the decrease in
the future interest rate rotates it in a counter-clockwise fashion around point A. The direct
Table 3: Value of Θ
ˆ r > n
(a) (b) (c)
η = 0 η = 1
10 η = 1
3
σ = 1
2 3.29 5.93 17.72
σ = 1 1.89 3.41 10.19
σ = 3
2 1.33 2.39 7.15
σ = ¯ σ 0.85 1.41 3.07
27eﬀect consists of the move from E0 to E′ and the general equilibrium eﬀect is the move from
E′ to E1.
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where we have used Lemma 1 (∆ > 0) and note that limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kTY. Both terms in
square brackets are positive so that welfare ambiguously rises in the long run. Indeed, the
general equilibrium eﬀect ensures that future generations gain even more than the shock-time
generation. The quantitative eﬀects in columns (c), (g), and (k) of Table 2 conﬁrm that,
regardless of the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, expected lifetime
utility increases dramatically as a result of the policy switch. In terms of Figure 3(b), the
budget line shifts further to the right in the long run both because the wage increases and
transfers are boosted. The decreased interest rate further rotates the budget line but this
eﬀect is not large enough to lead to a reduction in the choice set for future generations. Figures
2(b), (f), and (j) illustrate the transition paths of expected lifetime utility for diﬀerent values
of the intertemporal substitution elasticity. Welfare rises monotonically.
In order to develop the economic intuition behind the strong steady-state welfare gain,
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where Θ is deﬁned in (32) above. The switch from WE to TY is welfare increasing because
it induces an increase in the capital intensity and a decrease in the interest rate in the long
run, i.e. the policy switch moves the economy closer to the FBSO.
4 Tragedy of annuitization
In this section we step away from the assumption that the government redistributes accidental
bequests or wastes them completely. Instead we analyze the introduction of a private annuity
market. An annuity is a ﬁnancial asset which pays a given return contingent upon survival of
the annuitant to the second period of life. If the annuitant dies prematurely then his assets
accrue to the annuity ﬁrm. Let rA
t+1 denote the net rate of return on annuities. Assuming
28perfect competition among annuity ﬁrms, the zero-proﬁt condition is given by 1 + rt+1 =







It follows that 1 + rA
t+1 > 1 + rt+1, i.e. the return on annuities exceeds the return on regular
assets. Hence, in the absence of a bequest motive, it is optimal for the agent to fully annuitize
his ﬁnancial wealth. This conﬁrms ﬁndings by inter alia Yaari (1965) and Davidoﬀ et al.
(2005). Under full annuitization agents will no longer leave accidental bequests. In terms
of Table 1, the government budget constraint (T1.7) becomes redundant. Savings St are





























Furthermore, the fundamental diﬀerence equation for the capital intensity (T1.8) is replaced
by:








In the remainder of this section we study the allocation and welfare eﬀects of opening up
a perfect annuity (PA) market at time t. We ﬁrst study the case for which the initial scenario
is WE, i.e. the switch is from WE to PA and the initial capital stock features kt = ˆ kWE.
Next we study the case in which the switch is from the TY scenario to perfect annuities. In
this case the initial capital stock satisﬁes kt = ˆ kTY.
4.1 From wasteful expenditure to perfect annuities






where Γ(kt) is deﬁned in (19) above, Φ(k,z3) is given by:
Φ(k,z3) ≡
 





 σ  
1 − δ + αΩ0kα+η−1 σ−1
 −1
, (38)
29and z3 is a perturbation parameter (0 ≤ z3 ≤ 1). The partial derivative of Ψ(kt+1,z3)
with respect to the capital intensity is positive, Ψk > 0, but the partial derivative for the
perturbation parameter depends on the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution elasticity:
Ψz3 S 0 ⇔ σ T 1. (39)
We provide the following proposition.
Proposition 4 [Existence and stability of the PA model] Consider the PA model as given in
(37)–(38) and adopt Assumption 2. The following properties can be established:
(i) The model has two steady-state solutions; the trivial one features kt+1 = kt = 0, and
the economically relevant satisﬁes kt+1 = kt = ˆ kPA, where ˆ kPA is the solution to:
ˆ kPA
1 − Φ(ˆ kPA,1)
=
(1 − α)Ω0(ˆ kPA)α+η
1 + n
.




< 1, for kt+1 = kt = ˆ kPA.
For any given positive initial value the capital intensity converges monotonically to ˆ kPA.
(iii) The steady-state capital intensity satisﬁes the following inequality:
ˆ kPA S ˆ kWE ⇔ σ S 1
Proof: See Heijdra et al. (2010, Appendix D). ￿
In the benchmark case the intertemporal substitution elasticity is equal to unity, so that
it follows from (39) that the opening up of annuity markets has no eﬀect on the fundamental
diﬀerence equation (37). There is no transitional dynamics and the economy with perfect
annuities features the same steady-state capital intensity as under the WE scenario, i.e.
kt = ˆ kPA = ˆ kWE for all t. In terms of Figure 4(a), the initial equilibrium is at point E0.
Full annuitization rotates the budget line in a clockwise fashion and the new equilibrium is
at point E∞ which lies directly above E1 (since σ = 1). The additional resources resulting
from annuitization are thus shifted entirely to old age.
30Figure 2(d) and Table 2(d) conﬁrm that old-age consumption is signiﬁcantly higher fol-
lowing the policy shock. Note also from Figure 2(d) that the switch from WE to PA is quite
diﬀerent from the switch from WE to TO even though both constitute risk sharing among old
agents. In the latter case the anticipated transfers in old age lead to reduced saving during
youth which ultimately results in capital crowding out. In contrast, in the former case the
savings rate is unaﬀected by the policy change.
Since transfers are absent both before and after the opening up of annuity markets, the
shock-time old are unaﬀected by this event, i.e. dEΛ
y
t−1 (z3)/dz3 = 0. The welfare eﬀect on














where the ﬁrst term in square brackets is the direct eﬀect and the second term is the general
equilibrium eﬀect. In the special case with σ = 1 and kt = ˆ kPA the latter eﬀect is absent. It is
easy to show that for all admissible values of σ welfare unambiguously rises for all post-shock
generations – see also Table 2(d) and Figures 2(b), (f), and (j).
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where we have used Lemma 1 (∆ > 0) and note that limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kPA. The second term
in square brackets represents the general equilibrium eﬀect on factor prices. Of course, for
σ = 1 these eﬀects are absent and the impact and long-run eﬀects coincide.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that σ falls well short of unity. It follows readily
from (37) and (39) that for σ < 1 the impact and long-run eﬀects on the capital intensity of
the opening up of annuity markets are both negative:
dkt+1
dz3
   








   




Ψk − Γ′ < 0, (42)
where limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kPA. Equation (40) shows that welfare of the shock-time young in-
creases both because of the direct eﬀect and because of the increase in the future interest
rate. In the long run, however, capital crowding out results in a reduction in wages which
shrinks the choice set and reduces welfare for future generations. Figures 2(e)–(h) depict
the transition paths and Panel B of Table 2 provides quantitative evidence for the case with
31σ = 1
2. As the comparison between columns (e) and (h) of Table 2 reveals, capital crowding
out is so strong that steady-state welfare is lower under perfect annuities than it is under
the WE scenario! This is the ﬁrst instance of a phenomenon which we call “the tragedy of
annuitization.” Even though it is individually advantageous to make use of annuity products
if they are available, their long-run general equilibrium eﬀects lead to a reduction in welfare
of future generations.
The intuition behind the tragedy is not hard to come by. In the PA case the decentralized
steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the resource constraint (L2.2) in Lemma 2 as well






1 + ˆ rA 
1 + ρ
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f′(ˆ k) = ˆ r + δ, (P2)
ˆ g = 0. (P3)
The PA equilibrium removes two of the distortions plaguing the WE equilibrium. First, the
availability of annuities eliminates the missing-market distortion, i.e. π does not feature in
(P1) whereas it does in (W1). Second, there are no wasteful government expenditures. In-
deed, in the absence of the capital externality (η = 0) and if ˆ r = n then the PA equilibrium
decentralizes the FBSO – compare (S1)–(S3) to (P1)–(P3). But starting from a dynamically
eﬃcient economy (ˆ r > n) featuring a plausible value of the intertemporal substitution elas-
ticity (σ = 1
2), the switch from WE to PA is welfare decreasing because it induces capital
crowding out and an increase in the interest rate in the long run. Hence, the policy switch
moves the economy further away from the FBSO.
4.2 From transfers to the young to perfect annuities
We return to the benchmark case (with σ = 1) and assume that annuity markets are opened up
with the economy located in the steady-state equilibrium of the TY scenario, i.e. kt = ˆ kTY
initially. A policy switch from the TY case to the PA scenario now involves two distinct
changes. On the one hand, the availability of annuities boosts the rate at which the young
can save. On the other hand, full annuitization implies that accidental bequests are absent
so that the transfers to the future young are eliminated, i.e. Z
y
t+τ = 0 for τ = 1,2,.... The
combined eﬀect of these shocks can be studied with the aid of the following fundamental
32diﬀerence equations:
Ψ(kt+1,z3) = Γ(kt,1), Ψ(kt+τ+1,z3) = Γ(kt+τ), τ = 2,3,..., (43)
where Γ(kt), Γ(kt,1), and Ψ(kt+1,z3) are deﬁned in, respectively, (19), (23) and (37) above.
At time t there is a permanent switch from z3 = 0 to z3 = 1. From t+1 onwards transfers are
absent and the second expression in (43) describes the dynamic law of motion. The resulting
diﬀerence equations are solved using kt = ˆ kTY as the initial condition.
Since σ = 1 the marginal propensity to save out of current resources is constant. The
shock-time young still receive transfers. It follows that there is no eﬀect on saving, i.e.
kt+1 = ˆ kTY. Of course the young from period t + 1 onward no longer receive transfers and
these generations will reduce their saving. Over time the economy monotonically converges
to ˆ kPA which is strictly less than ˆ kTY (since, for σ = 1, ˆ kPA = ˆ kWE and ˆ kTY > ˆ kWE by
Proposition 3(iv)). Using (43) we ﬁnd the impact and long-run eﬀects of the policy change

















Ψk − Γ′ , (44)
where limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kPA. Recall that Ψk > 0, Γ′ > 0, Γz2 > 0 and Ψz3 S 0 ⇔ σ T 1.
It follows that there is capital crowding out both at impact and in the long run for realistic
values of σ (i.e., σ < 1) since Ψz3 is positive in that case.
The key eﬀects can be explained with the aid of Figure 4(b). The initial steady state is at
E0 and income during youth is equal to ˆ wTY + ˆ Zy. At impact the transfers are predetermined
but the interest rate at which the young save increases, i.e. the budget line rotates in a
clockwise direction. The new equilibrium is at point E1 which lies directly above point E0
(since σ = 1). In the long run, transfers are eliminated, capital is crowded out, the interest
rate rises and the wage rate falls. The long-run budget constraint passes through E∞ which
is the new steady-state equilibrium.
We visualize the transitional dynamics (for the case with σ = 1) in Panel A of Figure
5. The quantitative eﬀects are summarized in Table 2(d). Figure 5(a) conﬁrms the strong
crowding-out eﬀect on the capital intensity. Youth consumption of all but the shock-time
young falls as a result of the elimination of transfers (panel (c)) and old-age consumption of
survivors increases due to the higher return on savings (panel (d)). Comparing columns (c)
and (d) in Table 2 we ﬁnd that long-run output per worker falls by more than ﬁve percent.
33Since the old do not get any transfers both before and after the opening up of an an-
nuity market and they no longer save, the shock-time old are unaﬀected by this event, i.e.
dEΛ
y















The shock-time young beneﬁt for all admissible values of σ, i.e. regardless of whether next
period’s capital intensity falls (σ < 1) or rises (σ > 1). To this generation the beneﬁts of
annuitization are clear and simple.
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where we have used Lemma 1 (∆ > 0) and note that limτ→∞ kt+τ = ˆ kPA. The ﬁrst term in
square brackets is negative in a dynamically eﬃcient economy but the sign of the second term
depends on the strength of the intertemporal substitution eﬀect. For the empirically relevant
case, however, we have 0 < σ < 1, capital is crowded out in the long run, and long-run welfare
unambiguously falls.11
Figure 5(b) shows (for σ = 1) that lifetime welfare is reduced for all future generations
if a private annuity market is opened up. Only the shock-time young beneﬁt from annuiti-
zation. Eﬀectively, private annuities redistribute assets from deceased to surviving elderly in
an actuarially fair way whereas transferring unintended bequests to the young constitutes an
intergenerational transfer. This intergenerational transfer induces beneﬁcial savings eﬀects,
which, in the end, lead to higher welfare. This is the second example of a tragedy of annuiti-
zation. Even though it is individually rational to fully annuitize, this is not optimal from a
social point of view. If all agents invest their ﬁnancial wealth in the annuity market then the
resulting long-run equilibrium leaves everyone worse oﬀ compared to the case where annuities
are absent and accidental bequests are redistributed to the young.
11Indeed, the results in Table 2 conﬁrm that the same conclusion holds for σ =
3
2 – compare columns (j)
and (l). Of course in that case the capital intensity rises somewhat so that the welfare loss from the switch
from TY to PA is smaller.
34Figure 4: Private annuities in the exogenous growth model












































35Figure 5: Transition from transfers to annuities in the exogenous growth model
Panel A: from TY to PA (σ = 1)
(a) capital intensity (kt+τ) (b) expected lifetime utility (EΛ
y
t+τ)






























(c) youth consumption (C
y
t+τ) (d) old-age consumption (Co
t+τ)



























Panel B: from TO to PA (σ = 1)
(e) capital intensity (kt+τ) (f) expected lifetime utility (EΛ
y
t+τ)




























(g) youth consumption (C
y
t+τ) (h) old-age consumption (Co
t+τ)
































In the previous subsections we have seen two instances of the tragedy of annuitization. The
ﬁrst (from WE to PA) can be considered the strong version and the second (from TY to
PA) the weak version. The remaining question that must be answered is whether or not the
tragedy is inescapable. Does the introduction of a perfect annuity market always make future
generations worse oﬀ?
To answer this question we start by noting that in Table 2 steady-state welfare is lowest
for all scenarios considered in the case where accidental bequests are transferred to the old
(the TO scenario). If the switch from TO to PA would still give rise to the tragedy then this
would be an even stronger version than the one resulting from the change from WE to PA. It
turns out, however, that the tragedy does not arise when annuity markets are opened under
the TO scenario.
Formally, the switch from TO to PA again involves two distinct changes. First, full
annuitization implies that accidental bequests are absent so that the transfers to all but the
shock-time old are eliminated, i.e. Zo
t+τ = 0 for τ = 1,2,.... Second, the availability of
annuities boosts the rate at which the young can save. The combined eﬀect of these shocks
can be studied with the aid of (37). At time t there is a permanent change from z3 = 0
to z3 = 1 and (37) is solved using kt = ˆ kTO as the initial condition. Since σ = 1 in the
benchmark case, the marginal propensity to save out of current resources is constant. The
elimination of old-age transfers then immediately leads to an increase in saving by the shock-
time young, i.e. kt+1 > ˆ kTO. Over time the economy monotonically converges to ˆ kPA which
exceeds ˆ kTO (since, for σ = 1, ˆ kPA = ˆ kWE and ˆ kTO < ˆ kWE by Proposition 2(iii)).
In the interest of brevity we restrict attention to the key features of the shock. In Figure
4(c) the initial steady state is at E0, and non-asset income during youth and old-age is, respec-
tively ˆ wTO and ˆ Zo. At impact future transfers to the shock-time young and all generations
thereafter are eliminated and the rate at which the young save increases, i.e. the budget line
shifts down and becomes steeper. The new equilibrium is at point E1. In the long run, the
capital intensity increases further, the interest rate falls and the wage rate increases. The
long-run budget constraint passes through E∞ which is the steady-state equilibrium.
We visualize the transitional dynamics (for the case with σ = 1) in Panel B of Figure
5 and summarize the quantitative results in Table 2(d). Figure 5(e) conﬁrms the strong
38expansionary eﬀect on the capital intensity. Youth consumption falls at impact as a result
of the elimination of old-age transfers (panel (g)) but rises strongly thereafter. Old-age
consumption of survivors increases monotonically as a result of the expansion in the choice
set made possible by strong capital accumulation (panel (h)). Comparing columns (b) and
(d) in Table 2 we ﬁnd that long-run output per worker increases by almost ﬁfteen percent.
Figure 5(f) shows the welfare eﬀect on shock-time and future newborns. Interestingly, the
shock-time young are worse oﬀ as a result of the introduction of annuity products. For these
agents the increase in old-age consumption is insuﬃciently large to oﬀset the strong decrease
in youth consumption. All future newborns, however, are better oﬀ as a result of annuitization
opportunities.
In Panels B and C of Table 2 we present some steady-state evidence for diﬀerent values of
σ. We ﬁnd that PA always welfare dominates TO in the long run, regardless of whether the
intertemporal substitution eﬀect is weak (σ = 1
2 in Panel B) or strong (σ = 3
2 in Panel C).
The ﬁndings in this subsection bear a strong resemblance to the literature on the reform
of PAYG pensions. In a dynamically eﬃcient economy, a PAYG system is Pareto eﬃcient.
A pension reform in the direction of a fully funded system increases welfare of steady-state
generations but harms the shock-time old and possibly the young generations born close to
the time of the reform. The scenario considered here diﬀers from the pension reform case
because the shock is not policy induced but results from the emergence of a new longevity
insurance market.
5 The endogenous growth model
In this section we brieﬂy consider the knife-edge case featuring η = 1 − α. The model then
exhibits growth which is driven endogenously by the rate of capital accumulation. We can
solve (18) for the equilibrium growth rate:
(1 + n)(1 + γ) = [1 − Φ(¯ r)]
 













where γ ≡ kt+1/kt − 1 is the (time-invariant) equilibrium growth rate and we have used the
fact that the interest rate is constant in this scenario such that rt = ¯ r ≡ αΩ0 − δ for all
t. Using the expressions in (47) we can derive the equilibrium growth rates under the three
revenue recycling schemes and after the introduction of a private annuity market.
39(WE) If the government uses the proceeds from the accidental bequests for wasteful govern-
ment expenditures the growth rate becomes:
1 + γWE =
1 − Φ(¯ r)
1 + n
(1 − α)Ω0. (48a)
(TY) If instead the proceeds are redistributed to the young we ﬁnd:
1 + γTY =
1 − Φ(¯ r)
1 + n
[(1 − α)Ω0 + π (1 + ¯ r)]. (48b)
(TO) If the accidental bequests go the elderly then the growth rate is given by
1 + γTO =
1 + γWE
1 + Φ(¯ r) π
1−π
. (48c)
(PA) Finally, if a private annuity market is introduced we have:
1 + γPA =
1 − Φ(¯ rA)
1 + n
(1 − α)Ω0. (48d)
Straightforward inspection of the growth rates reveals that γTY > γWE > γTO for all
admissible values of σ. Hence, in terms of growth, it is better to give the accidental bequests
to the young than to use them for wasteful expenditures, yet it is better to let the accidental
bequests go to waste than to give them to the elderly.
Comparison with the private annuities scenario is more subtle. The introduction of private
annuities increases the rate against which individuals save. The savings response of consumers,
and thereby the growth rate in the perfect annuities scenario relative to the various recycling
schemes, depends on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ. For the
benchmark case with σ = 1 savings are independent of the interest rate and γTY > γPA =
γWE > γTO. If 0 < σ < 1 the higher interest rate will lead to less savings than in the
benchmark scenario so that we get γTY > γWE > γPA > γTO. Finally, if σ > 1 the higher
interest rate will lead to more savings which results in γPA > γWE > γTO and, depending on
the exact magnitude of σ, γPA T γTY.
In order to compare consumer welfare across the various scenarios we must recognize
the fact that steady-state expected lifetime utility grows at a scenario-dependent rate in an
endogenous growth model. To see this, note that if η = 1 − α we can write the consumption
















40where ri = ¯ r for i ∈ {WE,TY,TO} and ri = ¯ rA for i = PA. The value of the parameter θi
depends on the speciﬁc scenario i ∈ {WE,TY,TO,PA}.12 Wages grow over time according to




1 + γi τ
wt. (50)
Consider an economy that is initially in the WE scenario and features a wage rate at
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(51)
We call this welfare metric normalized utility. Clearly,   EΛ
y,i
t+τ depends both on post-shock
time τ and on the scenario-dependent (endogenous) value of γi. From equation (51) we
observe that with the introduction of a transfer regime or an annuity market there is both a
level eﬀect (represented by a change in the θi parameter) and a growth eﬀect (induced by a
change in γi). However, over time the growth eﬀect will always dominate the level eﬀect.
In order to quantify the growth and welfare eﬀects we adopt the following approach. For
n, π, α, δ, and r we use the same values as for the exogenous growth model (see the text
below Proposition 1). We calibrate an annual growth rate of one percent in the WE scenario
(γWE = 0.49) and obtain Ω0 = 15.72 and ρ = 1.78 (or 2.58% annually). The equilibrium
growth rate under the various policy schemes is reported in Table 4 for diﬀerent values of σ
and the corresponding welfare paths are depicted in Figure 6.
In line with the exogenous growth model we ﬁnd that if the economy exhibits endogenous
growth and the intertemporal substitution elasticity is in the realistic range (0 < σ ≤ 1) then
it is better to transfer the proceeds of accidental bequests to the young than to open up a
private annuity market – see Table 4 and Figure 6. In addition we ﬁnd that for low values
of σ it may even be better to waste the accidental bequests than to have a system of private
12For the three public policy regimes we get θ

















For private annuities r
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A and θ
PA = 1.
41Figure 6: Welfare paths in the endogenous growth model
(a) Weak intertemporal substitution eﬀect: σ = 1
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(b) Benchmark: σ = 1

















(c) Strong intertemporal substitution eﬀect: σ = 3
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42annuities. Hence, both the weak and the strong version of the tragedy of annuitization show
up in terms of economic growth rates.
Finally, we ﬁnd that only if σ is unrealistically high (e.g., σ = 3
2) private annuities slightly
outperform transfers to the young in terms of growth – see Table 4(c). However, in terms of
welfare, PA only outpaces the TY scenario after three periods (i.e. 120 years) and even then
only marginally so – see Figure 6(c).
6 Conclusion
We construct a tractable discrete-time overlapping generations model of a closed economy
featuring endogenous capital accumulation. We use this model to study government redistri-
bution and private annuities in general equilibrium. Individuals face longevity risk as there
is a positive probability of passing away before the retirement period. With an uncertain
life expectancy, non-altruistic agents engage in precautionary saving to avoid running out
of assets in old age. While they refrain from leaving intentional bequests to their oﬀspring,
they will generally make unintended bequests which we assume to ﬂow to the government.
Starting from a case in which the government initially wastes these resources we investigate
the eﬀects on allocation and welfare of various revenue recycling schemes. Interestingly, we
ﬁnd non-pathological cases where it is better for long-run welfare to waste accidental bequests
than to give them to the elderly. This is because transfers received in old age cause the in-
dividual to reduce saving which at the macroeconomic level results in a dramatic fall in the
Table 4: Annual steady-state growth rates with endogenous growth
η = 1 − α
(a) (b) (c)
σ = 1
2 σ = 1 σ = 3
2
WE 1.00 1.00 1.00
TO 0.26 0.26 0.26
TY 1.31 1.31 1.31
PA 0.64 1.00 1.35
43capital intensity and in wages.
Next we study the introduction of a perfectly competitive annuity market oﬀering actuar-
ially fair annuitization products. We demonstrate that there exists a tragedy of annuitization:
although full annuitization of assets is privately optimal it may not be socially beneﬁcial due
to adverse general equilibrium repercussions. For example, if the economy is initially in the
equilibrium with accidental bequests ﬂowing to the young, then opening up annuity markets
will reduce steady-state welfare regardless of the magnitude of the intertemporal substitution
elasticity. Intuitively, private annuities redistribute assets from deceased (unlucky) individ-
uals to surviving (lucky) elderly in an actuarially fair way whereas transferring unintended
bequests to the young constitutes an intergenerational transfer. This intergenerational trans-
fer induces beneﬁcial savings eﬀects, which, in the end, lead to higher welfare.
The existence of the tragedy is the rule rather than the exception. We ﬁnd an even
stronger version which states that revenue wasting dominates perfect annuitization, and we
show that it also turns up in an endogenous growth context. We investigate the robustness
of our conclusions by considering various constellations of the structural parameters.
In future work we hope to pursue the following extensions. First, we wish to endogenize the
labour supply decision in order to investigate the retirement eﬀects of accidental bequests,
recycling schemes, and the annuity market. In that context we will also introduce social
annuities – such as a PAYG pension system – which is an example of a scenario whereby
transfers ﬂow from the young to the old. Second, we wish to investigate the tragedy of
annuitization in an adverse selection economy. Following the insights of Heijdra and Reijnders
(2009), we will extend the model to include agents who diﬀer in health type. If health
status is unobservable to annuity ﬁrms the only feasible perfectly competitive annuity market
equilibrium involves risk pooling by healthy and unhealthy agents. We anticipate that the
market imperfection in the annuity market will only serve to provide further support for the
validity of the tragedy of annuitization.
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